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EDITH M. ASH, Appellant, v. W. S. MORTENSEN et al.,
Respondents.
[1] Damagcs-Measure-Personal Injuries-Aggravation by Negligence of Doctor.-Where one who has suffered personal
injuries by the tortious act of another exercises due care
in securing the services of a doctor and his injuries are
aggravated by the negligence of such doctor, the law regards
the act of the original wrongdoer as a proximate cause of
the damages flowing from the subsequent negligent medical
treatment and holds him liable therefor.
[2] Torts-Joint and Several Liability-Independent and Successive Acts.-Where injuries inflicted on a woman by a negli~
gent motorist were aggravated by the alleged negligence of
doctors who treated such injuries, the independent· and successive acts of the motorist and the doctors, differing in time
and place of commission as well as in nature, produced two
separate injuries and gave rise to two distinct causes of
action. The injured woman was at liberty to sue the motorist
for damages resulting from the original injury alone, and
to sue the doctors for damages resulting from the additional
injury or aggravation, in separate actions; and the order in
which such actions might be brought would be immaterial.
[3] Release-Persons Released-Independent Wrongdoers.-The
rule adopted in a number of jurisdictions that the release of
the original wrongdoer releases the attending doctor from liability for malpractice is not applicable in California, as such
rule has been reached by treating the independent wrongdoers
[1] Liability of one causing personal injuries for consequences
of negligence, mistake or lack of skill of physician or surgeon,
notes, 8 A.L.R. 506; 39 A.L.R. 1268; 126 A.L.R. 912. See, also,
15 Am.Jur. 495.
[3] Release of one responsible for injury as affecting liability
of physician or surg-eon for negligent treatment of injury, notes,
50 A.L.R. 1108; 112 A.L.R. 553. See, also, 22 Cal.Jur. 762; 41
Am.Jur. 252; 45 Am.Jur. 703.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Damages, § 66; [2] Torts, § 6;
[3, [i-8] Release, § 16(3); (4] Release, § 16(4); [9J Automobiles,
§ 361(1).

as joint tort feasors, or applying, by analogy, the commonlaw rule of unity of discharge affecting joint tort fl'asors.
[4] Id.-Persons Released-Joint Tort Feasors.-The <,ommon-Iaw
rule of unity of discharge affecting joint tort feasors is hased
on the concept of the unity of a cause of action against such
wrongdoers.
[5] Id.-Persons Released-Independent Wrongdoers.-A rel!'ase
of a cause of action against a wrongdoer is not a release of
a separate or distinct cause of action against another independent wrongdoer.
[6] Id.-Persons Released-Independent Wrongdoers.-A release
of one originally responsible for an injury should release an
attending doctor from liability for aggravation of the injury
if there has been full compensation for both injuries, but not
otherwise.
.
[7] Id.-Persons Released-Independent Wrongdoers-Full Compensation. - A woman who sued a motorist for injuries sustained in an automobile action did not receive full compensation for both such injuries and those aggravated by the alleg'ed
negligence of the doctors who attended her, where she relleivert
only slightly more than one-third of the amount of the judt;ment against the motorist, and she was entitled, in a separnte
malpractice action, to recover from the doctors for actual damages suffered by reason of their tortious acts, if any, for which
she had received no compensation.
[8] Id.-Persons Released-Independent Wrongdoers-Presumptions.-While a payment in consideration of the release of
one of several joint or independent concurrent tort feasors
may be presumed to have been made and accepted as full
compensation or satisfaction for the alleged injury, such
presumption should not be indulged where the injured person's claim embraces separate injuries caused by independent
successive tort feasors and is liquidated by a judgment against
the original tort feasor. The presumption of full compensation or satisfaction must be based on the fact that there is
but a single indivisible injury and that the claim arising
therefrom is unliquidated.
[9] Automobiles-Judgments-Conclusiveness.-A judgment in a
personal injury action against a negligent motorist is not, in 8
malpractice action against the dodors who treated plaintiff for the injuries sustained, binding on the doctors or res
judicata as to them, and they have the right to show what
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damage, if any, was actually suffered by reason of malpractice and to have the award in the malpractice action restricted
to the difference between such damage and any sum alread$
received by plaintiff as compensation therefor.

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Benjamin J. Scheinman, Judge. Reversed.
Action for malpractice.
versed.

Judgments for defendants re-

.Anne 0 'Keefe and Ralph C. Curren for Appellant.
Chase, Barnes & Chase, Wm. M. Rains and James W.
Brown for Respondents.
GIBSON, C. J.-Plaintiff was injured in an automobile
accident and received medical and surgical treatment necessitated thereby. In 1940 she sued Robert Wubben, the negligent motorist, and recovered judgment in the sum of $15,000.
Upon payment by Wubben of $5,753.22 the judgment was
satisfied Ot record and plaintiff signed a document releasing
him from further liability.
In August, 1941, plaintiff brought the present malpractice
action against W. S. Mortensen and W. L. Mortensen, th~
doctors who treated her injuries. Among other things, it waS
alleged that defendants negligently treated a fracture of the
femur bones by failing to secure them in position, and that,
notwithstanding the fact that an X-ray picture showed the
bones were out of position, defendants failed to reset them
and knowingly permitted them to heal in improper alignment,
as a result of which plaintiff's legs were shortened and bowed
and their use practically lost to her for life.
In their answers defendants set up the affirmative defense
that the judgment, satisfaction of record and release in the
first action against Wubben operated to discharge any liability
on their part. The issues thus tendered by the answers were
separately tried, and the court concluded that the facts pleaded
constituted a complete defense to this action. Accordingly,
judgment was entered in favor of each defendant, with costs,
and this appeal followed.
.
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Plaintiff urges that under general principles of tort law
the release of Wubben in consideration of part payment of the
judgment against him does not bar this malpractice action
against defendants who allegedly were negligent in treating
the injuries inflicted by Wubben. Defendants, on the other
hand, contend that since a person should not be twice compensated for the same injury and since plaintiff could have
recovered compensation for damages resulting from the alleged
malpractice in the action against Wubben, the release of
Wubben and" the satisfaction of the judgment in that action
are a complete defense to this action.
[1] It is settled that where one who has suffered personai
injuries by reason of the tortious act of another exercises due
care in securing the services of a doctor and his injuries are
aggravated by the negligence of such doctor, the law regards
the act of the original wrongdoer as a proximate cause of
the damages flowing from the subsequent negligent medical
treatment and holds him liable therefor. (Dewhwst v. Leopold, 194 Cal. 424, 433 [229 P. 30] ; Rest., Torts, § 457; McCormick, Damages, p. 272; note, 39 A.L.R. 1268.) [2] But
the fact that plaintiff could have obtained full compensation
for all damages in the action against Wubben, the original
wrongdoer, does not establish that she has been so compensated. The independent and successive acts of Wubben and
defendant doctors, differing in time and place of commission
as well as in nature, produced two separate injuries and gave
rise to two distinct causes of action. Plaintiff was at liberty
to sue Wubben for damages resulting from the original injury
alone, and to sue defendants for damages resUlting from the
additional injury or aggravation, in separate actions ; and the
order in which such actions might be brought would be immaterial. (See Parkell v. Fitzporter, 301 Mo. 217 [256 S.W.
239,243, 29 A.L.R. 1305] ; Rest., Torts, § 879, Illus. 3.) The
plea of former recovery, therefore, involves a consideration of
what the injured party did in fact recover in her action
again~he original wrongdoer rather than what she could
have recovered therein. (Wheat v. Carter, 79 N.H. 150 [106.
A. 602]; Parkell v. Fitzporter, 301 Mo. 217, supra; Staehlm
v. Hochdoerfer, (Mo.), 235 S.W. 1060; cf. Smith v. Coleman,
46 Cal.App.2d 507 [116 P.2d 133]; Viita v. Dolan (Viita V.
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Fleming), 132 Minn. 128 l155 ~. W. 1077, 1080, Anu. Cas.
1917E 678, L.R.A. 191pD 644].)
[3] Defendants insist, however, that without regard to the
evidence introduced in the action against Wubben, and thm:
without regard to the nature and extent of the recover:' t]If'l't·ill.
the release of Wubben from all liability operated to diselllll·g t •
them from liability for any negligent aggravation of tilp oJ"
inal injury. In their view, the amount of damages susta ilH'ti
plaintiff, the sum received as consideration for the release, .("
the relation between the two, the intention of the partIe.::;, all
the fact that Wubben and defendant doctors are illllependeli
rather than joint wrongdoers, are immaterial. In other worch
defendants seek to substitute a rule of law for the factual dp
fense of double recovery. The rule contended for has be(,l:
adopted in a number of jurisdictions. (Feinstone v. AlliSON
Hospital, 106 Fla. 302 [143 So. 251]; Paris v. Crittenden.
142 Kan. 296 [46 P.2d 633] ; Smith v. Mann, 184 Minn. 48!)
[239 N.W. 223] ; Adams v. DeYoe, 11 N.J.Misc. 319 [166 A.
485] ; Milks v. Mchror, 264 N.Y. 267 [190 N.E. 487] ; Tanner:
v. Espey, 128 Ohio 82 [190 N.E. 229] ; Thompson v. Fox; 326
Pa. 209 [192 A. 107, 112 A.L.R. 550] ; Martin v. Cunningham,
93 Wash. 517 [161 P. 355]; Mier v. Yoho, 114 W.Va. 248 [171
S.E. 535] ; cf. Wells v. Gould, 131 Me. 192 [160 A. 30] ; 112
A.L.R. 553.) But the conclusion that the release of the original
wrongdoer releases the attending doctor from liability for
malpractice has been reached by treating the independent
wrongdoers as joint tort feasors or applying, by analogy, the
common-law rule of unity of discharge affecting joint tort
feasors. [4] The common-law rule of unity of discharge is
based on the concept of the unity of a' cause of action against
joint tort feasors, and its application to the facts of the present
case would give the independent tort feasors herein an advantage wholly inconsistent with the nature of their liability.
Moreover, the rule contended for by defendants would stifle
compromises, favored in the law, inasmuch as the injured
person could not effect a settlement with the original wrongdoer without surrendering his separate cause of action against
one who, by his independent tortious act, aggravated the
injury.
[5] A release of a cause of action against a wrongdoer is
not a release of a separate or distinct cause of action against
l

another independent wrongdoer. It follows that the mere release of Wubben from liability did not result in the discharge
of the cause of action against defendants. [6] Weare of the
opinion that a release of the original wrongdoer should release an attending doctor from liability for aggravation of
the injury "if t:nere has been full compensation for both injuries, but not otherwise." (Prosser, Joint Torts and Several
Liability, 25 Cal.L.Rev. 413, 435; Wheat v. Carter, 79 N.H.
150 [106 A. 602] ; cf. Smith v. Coleman, 46 Cal.App.2d 507,
513 [116 P 2d 133]; Wallner v. Barry, 207 Cal. 465, 473
[279 P. 148].)
[7] Defendants next contend that plaintiff has in fact received full compensation for both injuries. They argue, in
this respect, that Dr. W. L. Mortensen, appearing as a witness for plaintiff in her action against Wubben, gave testimony concerning injuries which plaintiff now asserts resulted
from their negligence and for which she seeks damages in
this suit, and that the judgment against Wubben necessarily
included an award for damages suffered by reason of malpractice. Even if we assume, for purposes of argument, that
in her action against Wubben plaintiff sought to recover all
the elements of damages to which she may be entitled, the
record does not support the contention that plaintiff has received full compensation for both injuries. The only approximation of fair compensation for all the damages sustained by
plaintiff which the record in this case offers is the sum of
$15,000, the amount of the judgment against Wubben. Until
plaintiff has received money in excess of that figure, there is
nothing to show that she has been compensated twice for the
same injury. It is undisputed that plaintiff received only
*5,753.22, or slightly more than one-third of the amount of
the judgment, and, in our opinion, she is entitled to recover
from defendants for actual damages suffered by reason of
their tortious acts, if any, for which she has received no compensation.
[8] It has been held in some cases involving unliquidated
tort ,demands that the payment of any sum in consideration
of the release of one of several joint or independent concurrent tort feasors will be presumed to have been made and accepted as full compensation or satisfaction for the alleged
injury. (Hawber v. Raley, 92 Cal.App. 701 [268 P. 943];
Flynn v. Manson, 19 Cal.App. 400 [126 P. 181] ; Dwy v. C.on-
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necticut Co., 89 Conn. 74 [92 A. 883, L.R.A. 1915E 800];
Masterson v. Berlin St. R. Co., 83 N.H. 190 [139 A. 753] ; see
Dougherty v. CfLlifornia Kettleman Oil Royalties, Inc., 13 Cal.
2d 174, 181 [88 P.2d 690] ; cf. Tompkins v. Clay St. R.R., 66
Cal. 163 [4 P. 1165].) There is also authority to the contrary.
(McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659.) But whatever may be
the rule with regard to a settlement with joint or independent
tort feasors whose acts concur to produce a single injury, it
does not follow that such presumption should be indulged
where, as here, the injured person's claim embraces separate
injuries caused by independent successive tort feasors and is
liquidated by a judgment against the original tort feasor. The
presumption of full compeuaation or satisfaction found in the
cited cases must be based on the fact that there is but a single
indivisible injury and that the elaim arising therefrom is unliquidated. Under the circumstances of this case, it would be
more logical to presume that part payment of the Wubben
judgment represented merely the best obtainable compromise
for the liability of the judgment debtor. (Cf. McKenna v.
A.ustin, supra,p. 664.)
[9] We do not wish to be understood as holding that in
every case of this kind the question of double recovery is to
be determined solely by referenee to the amount awarded in
the first action. The jury's award in the action against Wubben is not binding on defendants or res judicata as to them.
They have the right to show what damage, if any, was actually
suffered by reason of malpractice and to have the jury's award
in this action restricted to the difference between such damage
and any sum already received by plaintiff as compensation
therefor. Defendants, however, successfully objected to an
attempt by plaintiff to introduce evidence of the nature and
e~tent of the separate injuries caused by the successive wrongdoers. There was therefore no consideration of the actual
facts, and the record is devoid of evidence from which double
recovery could be inferred.
The judgments are reversed.
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment. When plaintiff's
action against Wubben was tried, she was Still under the medical care of the defendants. On the trial of the aetion one of
the defendants testilied with regard to the nature of the in-
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jury suffered by plaintiff, the progress of her recuperation
until the date of trial, and her prospects for recovery. He
stated that plaintiff's right leg had improved enough so that
she could put weight on it, but that the fracture of the left
leg had not healed as well, because the ends of the bone were
not end to end, and that it might be another month or two
before there was a callous formation. Unless the hardening
took place within that time it would be necessary to use surgery to fasten the ends of the bone with a metal plate and
screws. As to the probability of plaintiff's future ability to
walk he said: "In any event, she probably will not be able
to walk at all normally with these legs in less than a year's
time, from the time of the accident. At that time she may he
left with some impairment to her walking." Plaintiff contend.'!
that the defendants were negligent, on the grounds that they
failed to secure the bones in proper position before making
the cast, and failed to reset the bones properly after discovering the improper alignment through X-rays. She claims that
as a result of this negligence she is not able to walk for more
than short distance.'!. The $15,000 judgment, insofar as it
took into account plaintiff's impaired physical condition, was
based on the e~pert testimony of one of the defendants; therefore neither defendants' possible negligence nor its possible
consequences beyond the complications of the healing process
described in the testimony had any influence on the judgment.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that plaintiff had
any information as to the alleged malpractice when she entered into the agreement with Wubben after the judgment.
For the purposes of this appeal it must therefore be assumed
that at the time of the trial of her action against Wubben
and of her agreement with him, plaintiff was ignorant of any
negligence of the defendants and acted on the advice received
from the defendants as her physicians.
If the improper alignment of the bones in the left leg was
a consequence of defendants' negligence, it was also a consequence of the accident which the jury could properly consider in reaching its verdict, since defendants' testimony
revealed plaintiff's aggravated condition. Other consequences
of defendants' alleged negligence, however, such as the alleged
failure to reset the bones properly, were not considered on
the trial, and the $15,000 judgment therefore does not fully
reflect tlie injury allegedly caused by negligence of the defendants.
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Any injury caused by malpractice of defendants that· was
not disclosed by the expert testimony at the trial and that
was therefore not reflected in the judgment can be recovered in this action, although the judgment rendered in plaintiff's action against Wubben is res judicata insofar as it was
based on the same facts as in the present action. (Bernhard
v. Bank of America, 19 Ca1.2d 807, 812 [122 P.2d 892];
Good Health etc. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14 [9 N.E.2d 758,
112 A.L.R. 401].) Defendants cannot rely on the former
judgment as res judicata insofar as their own misrepresentations, though innocently made, led to plaintiff's failure to
include her entire claim in the original action. (White v.
Adler, 289 N.Y. 34 [43 N.E.2d 798, 142 A.L.R. 898]; Vinesock v. Great Northern R. Co., 136 Minn. 96 [161 N.W. 494,
2 A.L.R. 530, 531]; Restatement: Judgments, §62(b) and
Comment; see Panos v. Great Western Packing Co., 21 Cal.2d
636 [134 P.2d 242] ; 2 A.L.R. 534, 142 A.L.R. 905.)
As to that part of the injury caused by defendants and
included in plaintiff's action against Wubben, the judgment
in that action cannot alone discharge defendants, but satisfaction of that judgment would discharge them in the absence of duress, fraud, or mistake. The applicable rule is
set forth in section 95 of the Restatement of J'udgments:
"The discharge or satisfaction of a judgment ngainst one of
several persons each of whom is liable for a tort, breach' of
contract, or other breach of duty, discharges each of the others from liability therefor." (See, also, Restatement: Torts,
§886.) This rule applies when the original wrongdoer satisfies a judgment that includes damages for aggravation of
the injury because of the negligence of an independent tortfeasor. (Restatement: Judgments, § 95, Comment c; see Butler v. Ashworth, 110 Cal. 614 [43 P.4, 386] ; Milks v: McIver,
264 N.Y. 267 [190 N.E. 487] ; Phillips v. Wern<Zorff, 215 Iowa
521 [243 N.W. 525] ; Thompson v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209 [192 A.
107, 112 A.L.R. 550] ; 29 Columb.L.Rev. 630, 634; 18 Cornell
L.Q. 257, 258; 41 Am.Jur., Physicians and Surgeons, § 137.)
Where a judgment against a defendant responsible for the
entire harm is satisfied as a whole, the obligation of another
obligor is extinguished, whether the judgment was discharged
by payment of its full amount or by any other performimce
received in satisfaction of the judgment. "The fact that
plaintiff recovered only part of the damages to which he was
entitled is immaterial" (2 ~'reeman on Judgments (1925),
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§ 578, p. 1225; Blackman v. Simpson, 120 Mich. 377 [79
N.W. 573, 58 L.R.A. 410] ; Westbrook v. Mize, 35 Kan. 299
[10 P. 881]), if the injured person has received "what in law
is deemed the equivalent" to actual satisfaction. (Urton v.
Price, 57 Cal. 270, 272; see Dawson v. Schloss, 93 Cal. 194,
199 [29 P. 31] ; Chetwood v. California Nat. Bank, 113 Cal.
414 [45 P. 704] ; Tompkin v. Clay St. R. R., 66 Cal. 163 [4 P.
1165]; Butler v. Ashworth, 110 Cal. 614 [43 P. 4, 386];
Grundel v. Union Iron Works, 127 Cal. 438, 442 [59 P. 826,
78 Am.St.Rep. 75, 47 L.R.A. 467]; Black v. Bringhurst, 7
Cal.App.2d 711 (46 P.2d 993] ; Minehan v. Silveria, 11 Cal.
App.2d 266 [53 P.2d 770] ; 6 Cal.L.Rev. 230.)
Plaintiff, according to the instrument she executed, received
$5,753.22 "for the purpose of making a full and final compromise, adjustment and settlement of all claims for injuries,
10000cs and damages resulting or to result from said accident"
and discharged Wubben "from any and all actions, causes
of actions, claims and demands of whatsoever kind or nature
on account of any and all known and unknown injuries, losses
and damages." It was therefore the obvious intention of the
parties to have the payment of $5,753.22 extinguish the entire
judgment, not merely a part of it. By thus discharging Wubben's entire obligation, the parties did not intend to reserve
plaintiff's rights against the other tort feasors for any damages covered by the judgment; nor could they have so intended, for neither of them knew or suspected that plaintiff
had any claim against defendants. If "facts and intentions
control" (McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659, 664), the settlement was made and accepted in full satisfaction of the judgment. Plaintiff's right of action against defendants for any
damages covered by the judgment would therefore be barred
were, it not for the fact that the agreement between her and
Wubben was made in ignorance of her claim against them. A
general release purporting to cover all claims does not extend
to claims that the creditor does not know or suspect exist in
his favor at the time of executing the release, if knowledge
of such claims would have materially affected his settlement
with the debtor. (Civ. Code, § 1542; Backus v. Sessions, 17
Cal.2d 380 [110 P.2d 51] ; O'Meara v. Haiden, 204 Cal. 354
(268 P. 334, 60 A.L.R. 1381J; see 30 Cal.L.Rev. 111; 96
A.L.R. 1144.) The provision in the release making it applicable
to "upknown injuries, losses and damages" relates only to
unknown claims against Wubben (see Berry v. Strubble , 20
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Cai.App.2d 299 [66 P.2d 746]), but not to unknown claims
against others.
. Plaintiff il). the present action may therefore recover: (a)
damages for that part of the injury that can be attributed
to malpractice of the defendants, which, because of their representations, innocent or otherwise, were not included in
the judgment against Wubben; (b) that part of the damages included in the jUdgment against Wubben that can be
attributed to malpractice of defendants, less such part, if any,
of the $5,753.22 already received from Wubben as exceeds
~.e amount of damages for which Wubben is alone responsible.
Edmonds, J., concurred.

Aug. 1944]

[4]

[5]

Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied September 1, 1944.
[6]

[L. A. No. 19005. In Bank. Aug. 11, 1944.]

CITY OF WHITTIER et al., Petitioners, v. GUY N. DIXON,
as City Clerk, etc., Respondent.
[1] l'4a~ndamus-Duties Enfarceable.-Mandamus will lie to COntpel the performance of a ministerial duty, such as the signing
of a bond or wal'l'ant or the issuance of a warrant.
[2]Statutes-Tltle-Su1ficiency of•....:..The title of an act meets
the requi,remenis of Const., art. IV, § 24, if it contains a rea:. sonably intelligible reference to the subject to which the legislation is addressed.
[SJ AutomobUes-Vehicle Parking District Act of 1945.-The
title of the Vehicle Parking District Act of 1943 (Stats. 1943,
p. 2859; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1943, Act 5131.3) contains
. 0. reasonably intelligible reference to the subject to which the
legislation is addressed. The levy and collection of assessments mentioned in the title include reassessments, and the
reference in the title to the acquisition and construction of
parking places and other improvements for parking includes

[1] See 16 Cal.Jur. 804; 34 Am.Jur. 859.
[21See 23 Cal.Jur. 650; 50 Am.Jur. 137.
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, § 6; [2] Statutus, § 48;
i[;i-7.J .A,)ltomnbiles, . ~ 8.

[7]
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the acquisition and improvement of lands, property and
rights of way necessary or convenient for ingress to or
egress from any parking place.
Id.-Vehicle Parking District Act of 1945.-The Vehicle
Parking District Act of 1943 does not violate Const., art.
XI, § 13, prohibiting the delegation of any municipal function to a special commission, where the parking place commissioners therein authorized to be appointed are city officers
appointed by the legislative body of the city when it elects
to acquire parking places under the act, and are removable
at the pleasure of that body.
Id.-Parking Places.-Legislation authorizing the acquisition
of parking places to serve the public is valid so long as it
serves some public p'lrpose. Public parking places relieve
congestion and reduce traffic hazards and therefore serve a
public purpose.
Id.-Parking Places-Assessments.-Parking places that tend
to stabilize a business section benefit the property in the
vicinity so as to justify the levy of a special assessment in
connection with the acquisition of such places.
Id.-Parking Places-Eminent Domain.-A city can condemn
property for parking places under the Vehicle Parking District Act of 1943, although such authority is not granted by
the eminent domain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, as the Vehicle Parking District Act is a general law
and expressly authorizes the exercise of the power of eminent
domain to acquire parking lots.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel a city clerk to
countersign a warrant for payment of costs of pUblication of
an ordinance of intention. Writ granted.
Henry L. Knoop, City Attorney, 0 'Melveny & Myers and
James L. Beebe for Petitioners.
Clyde C. Woodworth for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-By this proceeding in mandamus petitioners seek to compel respondent city clerk to countersign a war.
rant for the payment of the costs of publication of an ordinance of intention, in a proceeding for the formation of Vehicle Parking District No. 1 of the City of WhIttier, under
the Vehicle Parking District Act of 1943. (Stats. 1943, ch.
971, p. 2859; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1943, Act 5131.3.) Respondent has refused to countersign the warrant contending
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